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		INTELLIGENCE	REPORT		
OUNTRY	Germany (Russian Zon	10)	DA		
UPJECT	Views of Soviet Offi	icers on		2 February	948
	Future War		PAG		
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STATE	WAR MANY JUSTICE				
1.	Senior Soviet offic lines of thought pr The officers, whose	in Zwickau t	that there are at Soviet General Sta	ff and officer co	ros.
	The officers, whose	remain a sire sum	Col. Bondarenko		50X1-HUM
			Col. Platov Mej. Blegonov		
			Maj. Kisha		
	b. Officers belong to field for at	ing tions:	Col. Gemballa Col. Leshitski		
			Maj. Chomyakov Maj. Heinsius		
			Maj. Muravyev Maj. Zinbeluk		
		*	Col. Diez Col. Krilov Col. Sherenmen) very cauti) in their tyev) conversation	
2.	These two lines of	thought are as f	ollows:		•
	a. Offensive. Cor	n Europe. The ad- who have been the	herents to this I: rough the Communi hefore all milit	ine of thought arest Party schools ary consideration ttle military kno	end e; wledge,
	get the goals of	fficers, who have rose quickly dur	ing the war and a	re rarty yes-men.	
	b. Defensive. The have the brains and tactical co success, in the drawal behind northern flank, then transfer and at the same	rose quickly dur e numerically sma s and who have be onsiderations. T a event of a war the Vistula, thus , which would rem forces to threate	ller faction, but een thoroughly tra this faction sees against the Weste affording protection on the defens med areas clony h possible partisan	those officers wined in strategic the only chance or rn Powers, in wit tion for the Sovi ive. The USSR co er Southern front s, such as the Ge	ho al f h- et uld iers

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- 3. This defensive party agrees that an offensive against the Mestern Powers would initially result in major military successes and that the Soviet Army would perhaps reach the Atlantic, but that a counter-attack by the Western Powers, the weight of which would only be felt after three or four months, coupled with blockade, an attack by the Japanese (sic) in the Far East and destruction of lines of communication by the superior western air forces, would result in the total defeat of the Soviet Army.
- 4. The offensive party appears at present to be in the ascendant and in the event of war the dissidents would be caught up in the stream. There is, however, a general war-weariness among Soviet troops in Germany and, as a result, an increasing decline in morale.
- 5. An eventual offensive is nevertheless frequently discussed by Soviet officers in the Zwickau area, an offensive based solely on the numerical and material superiority of the Soviet Army, which would quickly overwhelm the Western Powers. Two hundred and fifty to three hundred front line divisions with 50,000 tanks, 12,000 gasoline trucks, and 3,000 armored troop-cerriers are said to be available for the operation.
- 6. The plan of attack discussed is as follows:
 - a. Major frontal attack in depth from the Halberstadt-Hildburghausen area towards Cologne, Mannheim, and Karlsruhe.
 - b. Simultaneous strong attacks from the Stendal-Halberstadt area towards Hammover and Hamburg and continuation on the Hammover-Muster axis towards the North Sea.
 - c. Simultaneous occupation of Czechoslovakia and,
 - d. Thrust from the Plauen-Meiningen area towards Murnberg and Regensburg and break-through to the Swiss frontier.

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